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The U.S. Attacks on Afghanistan:
An Act of Self-Defense Under Article 51?
Sikander Ahmed Shah1
INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, a tragic chain of events stunned the world. On
the morning of that fateful day, terrorists hijacked four U.S. commercial
jetliners, ramming two of the hijacked planes into the two towers of the
World Trade Center in New York City.2 The towers were eventually
reduced to rubble.3 Moments later, the third jetliner rammed into the
Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the fourth plane crashed in the
Pennsylvania countryside, supposedly on its way toward the capital.4 The
results were devastating, leaving 2,973 people dead, most of them civilians.5
On October 7, 2001, U.S. and British forces commenced bombing raids on
Afghanistan.6 The United States declared that the attack was self-defense,
under Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter.7 To date, countless
Afghani civilians have been killed as a result of continuing allied air strikes
and operations.8 Many more individuals have suffered starvation because
of the continued air raids and suspended food supply deliveries.9 Most
individuals have been displaced from their homes and are refugees in, or on
the borders of, Pakistan, Iran, and the Central Asian Republics.10 Even
given the history of warfare and internal strife that has plagued Afghanistan
for the last thirty years, and the breakdown of the administrative and
distributive capacity that this has engendered, the suffering of the Afghani
people arising from U.S. action in the country is without measure. Posterity
will judge U.S. action in Afghanistan not only on the basis of the legality of
its military actions, but also on the basis of restorative and rehabilitative
actions undertaken in acknowledgement of such suffering. Despite the
significant impact this war has had on many Afghani civilians, few have
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seriously considered whether the U.S. attack on Afghanistan qualifies as
self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.11
Accordingly, Part I of this article begins this discussion with an analysis
of the requirements for self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter,
including a definition of terrorism. Part II argues that the U.S. attacks on
Afghanistan were not self-defense under Article 51. Assuming for
argument’s sake that the United States’ initial attacks were justified, Part III
considers whether the United States’ continued attacks on Afghanistan can
also be justified as self-defense. Finally, Part IV addresses what the
international community can do to remedy this problem. One idea would be
to empower specialized monitoring bodies under the UN to determine the
occurrence of an armed attack, assist all concerned parties to settle their
disputes amicably, and prevent unnecessary acts of retaliation and
retribution under the guise of self-defense. Finally, this paper concludes
that the U.S. attack on Afghanistan was not self-defense under Article 51 of
the UN Charter.

I. SELF-DEFENSE UNDER THE UN CHARTER
This section defines exactly what behaviors constitute self-defense under
Article 51 of the UN Charter. The section begins with a summary of the
applicable text of the UN Charter. This textual summary is followed by a
discussion of the term terrorism with a focus on state terrorism. Finally, the
section concludes with a discussion of the term “armed attack” under
Article 51.
Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, member states are to “refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”12 Unless such
force is specifically authorized by the Security Council, member states are
only allowed to use force or aggression under the Charter if such force or
aggression is taken in self-defence.13 Article 51 states that “[n]othing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
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self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.”14
A. Definition of Terrorism
Terrorism must be defined in order to determine if an attack of terrorism
warrants self-defense by the state under attack. To date, terrorism is an
undefined term in international law. To understand the concept of
terrorism, it is imperative first to trace its history and evolution under
international law. In addition, regardless of the somewhat nebulous
definition that accompanies the definition of terrorism, it is important to
remember that “[u]se of the term [terrorism] implies a moral judgment; and
if one party can successfully attach the label terrorism to its opponent, then
it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint.”15
After the UN was created, two schools of thought emerged which shaped
the dialogue about the definition of terrorism.16 On one side were those
who argued that normative responses to prohibited conduct could not be
devised, unless there was agreement on what activities were actually
prohibited.17 On the other side, the realists believed that it was impossible
to agree upon a definition of terrorism and that the best way to proceed was
to define terrorism on a case by case basis.18 To the realists, no bright-line
rule existed; therefore, whether or not particular conduct was sanctioned as
terrorism could depend on very slight variations in the factual
circumstances surrounding the conduct.19
In 1979, the Ad-Hoc Committee on Terrorism, which was created by the
UN General Assembly, attempted and failed to come up with a concrete
definition of terrorism.20 Some individuals argued that actions against
prohibited targets should be defined as terrorism. Others emphasized that
the purpose of the action(s) undertaken was the crucial determinant, while
others looked at the characteristics and motives of the perpetrators.21 The
problem with these definitions was that they were too broad, created
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uncertainty, and could be used against actions undertaken by states, which
the states themselves considered to be legitimate under the norms of
international law.22 Despite years of effort on the General Assembly’s part,
significant difficulties like those outlined in this section prevented the
Assembly from providing more than a few elements of what constituted
terrorism.23
One significant issue that has hindered the establishment of a concrete
definition of terrorism has been the lack of initiative by the world
community. Specifically, developed Western nations were afraid that if
terrorism was concretely defined, the actions they undertook for selfdefense or for international peace purposes might eventually be perceived as
terrorism.24 In addition, third world nations were afraid that legitimate
freedom and national liberation movements would be classified as
terrorism.25
With the fall of the Soviet Empire, for all practical purposes, the UN
came under the direct control of the West.26 In 1989, the UN passed a
resolution that no terrorist activity could be justified even if it was
committed during a freedom struggle.27 Henceforth, the Western realists
slowly started establishing norms and behavior that were termed as
“terrorism” under specific circumstances. Offenses against diplomats,
states taking hostages, allowing one’s territory to be used for military action
against another state, and actions against another state’s civilians (real acts
or threats that instill fear or terrorize the public) were all deemed terrorist
activities. However, these norms have not been universally applied.28
1. State Terrorism
Even though the international definition of terrorism is still evolving,
state terrorism has been defined with somewhat more specificity because it
is distinct in that it necessarily implies that acts of international terrorism
are taking place.29 With regard to state terrorism, the question arises
whether there is sufficient nexus between the state and terrorist activities
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associated with it, in order to establish that state terrorism exists therein.
More specifically, state terrorism has been defined as “acts of violence
which are outside the accepted acts of international diplomacy and rules of
war.”30 It is important to note that the General Assembly’s Declaration on
Friendly Relations (2625 (XXV)) stated that “each State has a duty not to
organize or encourage acts of civil war and terrorism on another State’s
territory or to tolerate on its own territory, activities organized with a view
to perpetrating such acts.”31 Thus, the key issue in a state terrorism inquiry
is whether there is a sufficient nexus between the state and terrorist
activities associated with it. Specifically, four levels of state involvement in
terrorism have been identified: (1) state inaction, (2) state toleration, (3)
state support, and (4) state sponsorship.32
a) Level One: State Inaction
The first level of state terrorism is known as state inaction. State inaction
occurs when a state lacks the ability to control terrorist activities taking
place from its soil.33 Under such circumstances, states have sometimes
asked for external assistance to deal with this form of terrorism.34 However,
states have also used state inaction as an excuse to violate the territorial
integrity of other states without waiting for requests for assistance.35
Unfortunately, world condemnation of such incursions has been muted or
the responsibilities of the intervening states have been held to be
diminished.36 The legal basis for the intervening state’s conduct was
established in the Corfu Channel case.37 The case involved British warships
traversing Albanian territorial waters, where a number of British sailors
were killed when British ships unexpectedly struck mines.38 The court,
while finding that Albanian sovereignty had been violated, nonetheless
observed that Albania’s complete failure to exercise its sovereign powers
created “attenuating circumstances for the United Kingdom government.”39
Using state inaction to justify violations of a state’s territoriality is
gravely problematic because more often than not it will be the poor third
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world countries that are perceived as unable to handle supposed terrorist
outfits operating from their soil. Consequently, such justifications provide a
pretext for richer, more powerful states to imperil the norms of international
law by arguing that the gravity of the terrorist acts justified their response.
This result is problematic because the UN was created for the very
purpose of maintaining international peace and security.40 Bypassing the
procedures laid out within the UN Charter questions the purpose of the
Charter’s existence. While the UN has not always been effective, and while
it is easily dominated by a few states, it still enjoys the support of the
international community.41
Therefore, allowing individual states to
establish a variable standard for violating another state’s sovereignty
grossly undermines the basis upon which the international community
exists. When this process is bypassed, the safety of the international
community is compromised. 42
b) Level Two: State Toleration
The next level of state involvement in terrorism is termed state
toleration. State toleration takes place when a state is aware that terrorist
outfits are operating from its soil, and the state, though possessing the
capacity to suppress such activities, abstains from doing so.43 Significantly,
the state does not provide any sort of a support to such outfits.44
Additionally, these outfits are self-supporting and generally have some form
of foreign assistance. 45
c) Level Three: State Support
A higher level of state involvement is state support. Here the state
provides all kinds of support to terrorist outfits—military training, arms,
rhetorical support, financing, tactical support, safe havens, logistical
support, travel documentation, intelligence, and transportation.46 However,
such states do not direct the specific terrorist acts; in other words, these
states stop short of assuming command and control of such outfits. 47
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d) Level Four: State Sponsorship
The gravest form of state involvement is state sponsorship.48 State
sponsorship occurs when states utilize terrorism “as another weapon of
warfare to gain strategic advantage where they cannot use conventional
means.”49 The terrorist is, in all practicality, a de facto agent of the culpable
state. State sponsorship therefore occurs when a state directs, controls, and
commands the terrorist outfits and their activities.50
2. Determination of State Involvement as Terrorism
Many questions arise at this juncture. How is one to determine the level
of state involvement, and how can one determine the authenticity and level
of proof required to determine the level of state involvement? Are remedial
actions undertaken by states accused of terrorism intended to curb terrorism
or to punish terrorists in order to exonerate themselves?
It is difficult, if not impossible, to provide answers to these questions.
For example, there is absolutely no international consensus on the level of
proof necessary to determine state sponsorship.51 Unfortunately, in the past,
the majority of states that have retaliated on the basis of possessing
sufficient proof against other states have later been found to be incorrect in
their assessment and wrong about the soundness of proof relative to the
degree of terrorist involvement.52 Even when states are later found to be
involved in terrorism, their degree of involvement has often been
insignificant enough that an armed retaliation was not justified. Thus, as a
result of fallacious reasoning to determine state sponsorship, many innocent
states and quasi-innocent states have been attacked and numerous civilian
installations have been destroyed.53
Retaliating states often respond hastily and do not wait to substantiate the
questionable proof they possess.54 The primary reason for hasty decisions
to attack states for the purpose of curbing terrorism is that the states making
these decisions are predominantly strong military powers and often possess
disproportionate military strength relative to the states they attack. These
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heavily armed states are often reluctant to retaliate hastily or forcefully
against states with equal or greater military might in comparison, despite
the perception that the other state may be a sponsor of terrorism.55 The
rationale for this decision is that the repercussions of such retaliatory attacks
can be immense and the well-placed fear of a full-fledged war is obvious.56
In other words, a deterrent is in place.
The behavior that attacking states exhibit on the basis of inadequate proof
sends the wrong signals to the world community and sets a precedent for all
states. It encourages states to impetuously commit aggression against other
states on the basis of self-defense without the risk of being reprimanded for
any errors in judgment. This is true not only for the states that use this
precedent as a pretext for justifying their self-interests, but also for those
that suffer from the absence of an adequate paradigm for determining
factual disputes (such as proof regarding state terrorism), as these states
become frustrated and then make unilateral determinations.
B. Definition of Armed Attack for Purposes of Article 51
For any measures to be taken in self-defense under Article 51, there must
be an armed attack. The framers of Article 51 purposely utilized the
restrictive terminology of an “armed attack” instead of an act of
“aggression” as a necessary condition for undertaking self-defense.57
According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
while interpreting statutes, words are to be given their ordinary meanings.58
Thus, applying Article 31’s interpretation to Article 51, armed attack is a
subset of aggression.59 The consensus definition of aggression,60 which was
formally adopted by the General Assembly in 1974,61 is a much broader
concept and does not require actual use of force. Rather, mere threats of
force qualify as acts of aggression, which in turn are prohibited under
Article 2(4).62 Aggression can also be economic in nature.
On the other hand, states have acknowledged this extremely restrictive
definition of an armed attack.63 The meanings adduced for armed attack
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from several dictionaries all imply the actual occurrence of harm, as
opposed to the mere threat of force.64 Furthermore, Article 51 of the UN
Charter, which is one of the two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of
force in Article 2(4), uses the word “occurs” with reference to armed attack,
and does not talk about the threat of an armed attack.65 Thus, only the
actual use of force, which results in the violation of the territorial integrity
of another state, qualifies as an armed attack.66 Retaliation against action
that does not qualify as an armed attack is anticipatory self-defense which
has not, as of yet, been condoned in international law.67 However, it is
important to note that the degree of attack is not so pertinent an inquiry
when determining if an armed attack has occurred.68 The reason for such a
holding is that retaliatory responses to armed attacks must be proportional
under customary international law as discussed in Part IV of this paper.
Therefore, states are unable to use a trivial incident by cloaking it as an
armed attack to justify disproportionate retaliatory responses.69
A more difficult analysis is required when the argument put forward is
that an armed attack against a retaliating state has occurred and a retaliating
state indulges in an interceptive attack for self-defensive purposes. An
interceptive attack can be defined as an action undertaken to repulse an
armed attack, “which is imminent and practically unavoidable,”70 when an
irreversible course of action has taken place,71 but no actual force has yet
been felt by the retaliating state.72 This theory raises the issue of the degree
of irreversibility that a course of action needs to attain for it to legitimately
qualify as an armed attack. If such actions are truly irreversible, then a
force is in motion that is no longer under the control of the attacking state;
therefore, an armed attack has already occurred.73 An interceptive attack in
such circumstances would be appropriate. For example, an armed attack
would take place if a nuclear warhead has been fired by a particular state
unto another state, and the aggressor state no longer possesses the capability
to stop the warhead, but the warhead had not yet entered the air space of the
attacked state. Conversely, an armed attack would not take place if planes
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have commenced their journey to conduct air raids on enemy territory, but
have not yet entered enemy air space or attacked enemy territory. The
reason for these different results is that in the latter example, the aggressor
state has the capability to stop the potential attack.74
However, this paradigm has some serious shortcomings. For example, it
is difficult to determine with absolute certainty the point at which a state
does or does not not possess the capability to stop a potential force it has put
in motion. This might be a simple task in the case of aircrafts about to
begin air raids, but is a nearly impossible task in the context of fired nuclear
weapons. The enemy attack can only be repulsed or intercepted when the
force put in motion is reversible. In other words, when the force is
irreversible, the intercepting state lacks the capability to stop the armed
attack.
This less-than-perfect paradigm is a better option than its alternatives. In
the absence of such a system of restraint, states will use the concepts of
anticipatory and interceptive self-defense as pretexts to infringe on the
territoriality of other states. Such acts will threaten international peace and
security and, in the worse case scenario, might lead to the breakdown of the
present international system.75 Therefore, having this draconian paradigm
in place provides a disincentive for states to freely violate international
norms on the basis of self-defense. This paradigm also places a heavy
burden of proof, sometimes impossible to satisfy, on states indulging in socalled retaliatory actions. Unfortunately, these unreasonable constraints and
undue hardships will be placed on states that genuinely have a cause of
action for retaliation. The world community in such circumstances will be
less critical of breaches of territorial sovereignty by retaliating states, and
the force of their condemnation will accordingly be muted.76
C. Whether State Terrorism is an Armed Attack
The answer to the question of whether state terrorism is an armed attack
is less than clear. Traditionally, states have been held responsible only for
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actions taken on behalf of the state.77 States have not been accountable for
private acts.78 However, according to the International Law Commission’s
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
a state is responsible for actions of non-state actors when such actors are in
direct control of the state.79
As discussed above, assuming terrorism and an armed attack have been
perpetuated against a state, the question becomes what degrees of state
involvement relative to terrorist activities are grave enough to implicate and
hold responsible the aggressor state for the armed attack. Fortunately, this
question has been answered, though in somewhat broad and general terms,
by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States.80 The
court held that Nicaragua’s intervention in El Salvador by providing
“assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or
other support” did not constitute an armed attack for self-defense
purposes.81 This phrase has been interpreted to imply that unless an organ
of the state itself is involved in the terrorism, any form of tactical, logistical,
financial support, etc., to a terrorist group is insufficient to implicate a state
for undertaking an armed attack.
In other words, under the Nicaragua case, a cause for self-defense is
appropriate only when there is state sponsorship of a terrorist outfit—when
the outfit is under the direct command and control of the state and is thus a
de facto organ of the state.82 However, in Nicaragua, the court held that
where the nexus between the state and the terrorist outfit involved logistical
support (state support), etc., but did not amount to state sponsorship, a
wronged state could take “proportionate countermeasures” against the use
of force.83 What constituted proportionate countermeasures was left largely
undefined, but the court explicitly stated that coming to the aid of other
states for collective self-defensive purposes was not within its contours.84
The level of command and control present between a state and a terrorist
outfit raises another issue. What about a situation when, instead of a
terrorist outfit being a de facto organ of a particular state, a state itself
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becomes a terrorist organ when it comes under the command and control of
a terrorist outfit? Surely this cannot be an instance of state sponsorship.
This situation is more akin to state inaction, but it is different in the sense
that citizens of the terrorist-based state might actually be victims of
terrorism. In other words, such a state has been hijacked. Apart from
justifying its action as self-defense, the retaliating state could bolster its
position by arguing that application of force against the terrorists does not
infringe upon the territoriality of the hijacked state because the state is not
within its own control. Rather, such application of force would liberate that
hijacked state and could be termed as a weak form of collective selfdefense—the self-defense being that of the hijacked state. This form of
self-defense is weak because the presumption is that the states involved
herein did not have any kind of a collective self-defense pact. However,
this justification is much stronger than the one put forward in the Corfu
Channel case for violating territoriality. This is because not only is the
terrorist-based state not in a position to reign in these terrorists, but the state
itself is a victim of terrorism. However, this preceding self-defense
paradigm justification, similar to the one advanced for “state inaction,” is
subject to abuse and can provide a pretext for infringement upon state
territoriality, especially that of third world countries, as discussed earlier.
What might be a freedom movement for a third world country could easily
be termed as state hijacking by some developed nations.

II. THE ATTACK ON AFGHANISTAN AND SELF-DEFENSE
The September 11 attack on the United States would be classified as a
terrorist attack under the present rules and norms of international law.85
The attack primarily targeted civilians and was undertaken to send a
message to the U.S. government.86 By instilling fear in the citizens of the
United States, the attackers intended to pressure the U.S. government to
reconsider foreign policy. As mentioned earlier, since the demise of the
Soviet Union, realists have managed to overcome and subdue the normative
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ideology; therefore, the realist notion of terrorism is controlling today.87 In
the past, the realists have clearly classified attacks similar in nature to those
that took place on September 11 as terrorism.88 In addition, normative
thinkers may also classify the September 11 attacks as terrorism. Such
thinkers would argue that there was clear agreement between the
overwhelming majority of states before the attack took place that such an
act would fall within the definition of terrorism.
Some have argued that September 11 was not an act of terrorism but was
a legitimate use of force undertaken to achieve the inherent right of selfdetermination and was part and parcel of a freedom struggle.89 Such an
argument is without substance, for even if the act had been qualified as an
act undertaken during the course of a freedom movement, it would still be
considered an act of terrorism: under the current realist regime, the UN
General Assembly adopted a resolution in 1989, giving examples of
situations in which the right of self-determination cannot permit acts of
terror.90
In addition, given the specific circumstances of the September 11 attacks,
the freedom movement justification can be rejected on alternative grounds.
Assuming that the perpetrators were Islamic militants or members of al
Qaeda, their freedom objective can either be freedom of Islam from the
West, specifically the United States, or the freedom of Palestine from Israeli
occupation,91 the latter directly funded and supported by the United States.
The former reasoning—that the attack was a freedom struggle—can easily
be discarded because, as defined under international norms and rules, a
freedom struggle relates only to nations and states based on the Westphalia
system. Islam is not a state, and it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to
argue that all people practicing the Islamic faith qualify as a nation. The
latter freedom justification can be rejected on the fact that the
overwhelming majority of the attackers were non-Palestinians.
Furthermore, the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is universally
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recognized as the true representative of the Palestinian cause and people,
condemned the attacks as terrorist acts.92
The September 11 attacks also constituted a terrorist attack on the United
States because its territorial integrity was purposely and clearly infringed
upon. Some critics utilizing a formalistic approach argue that under the UN
Charter only states are capable of indulging in armed attacks and
independent terrorist organizations, unless organs of states themselves,
cannot undertake an armed attack for purposes of Article 51.93 Based on a
broad interpretation of the intent of the Charter’s framers, the stronger
argument would be to the contrary because the framers of the Charter did
not contemplate that one day some terrorist organizations would be as
strong as states and would have the capability to severely harm states.
Taking into account the purpose of the framers—protection against an
armed attack—renders the nature and identity of the individual perpetrators
as state or non-state actors irrelevant.
The final inquiry is whether the nexus between the state of Afghanistan
and the al Qaeda terrorist network is such that al Qaeda is nothing but an
organ or agent of the Afghani State. In other words, the question is whether
state sponsorship is taking place. This is surely not the case. Afghanistan is
one of the poorest countries in the world and is in ruins because of years of
civil war and drought.94 Furthermore, it does not possess the monetary or
human capital or any other resources to command and control organizations
such as al Qaeda.95
Following the inception of Operation Enduring Freedom, the UN
Security Council endorsed the U.S. attack on Afghanistan, thereby
effectively lowering the required threshold of state involvement below what
had previously been established in both the Nicaragua and Tadic
judgments.96 The Security Council went on to condemn the Taliban regime
for allowing Afghanistan to be used by terrorist networks.97
By
acknowledging that the September 11 attack sanctioned the United States to
invoke its inherent right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter,
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the UN Security Council effectively opened the door for states to make
unilateral decisions on whether an armed attack has taken place on their
territory. This paved the way for the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Israel’s attack
on Lebanon, and the development of the Bush doctrine, which clearly
announced the United States’ intention to preemptively attack in selfdefense.98 The Bush doctrine indicates a clear reversal of U.S. strategy
because the United States has always opposed preemptive attacks in selfdefense.99 Attacks in preemptive self-defense are still illegal under
international law.100 Such laxity on the part of the UN Security Council
could very well unleash state attacks against one another in preemptive
action.101
Afghanistan’s involvement could at best be classified as a weak form of
state support, as they were harboring and providing a safe haven to
supposed terrorists. They are considered “supposed” terrorists because the
Afghani establishment, the Taliban, even on insistence, was not given any
evidence by the United States regarding the culpability of al Qaeda
members, with regard to the September 11 attacks.102 In fact, the ruling
Taliban regime, whatever its true intentions, unlike Libya, which had
refused to hand over Lockerbie suspects,103 had offered to hand over Osama
bin Laden to a neutral Islamic country such as Jordan upon a showing of
credible evidence.104 This offer would have allowed the neutral country to
try bin Laden for the charges levied against him or his organization.105 By
refusing this offer, the United States might be considered the party in
violation of Article 2(3) and Article 33 of the UN Charter.106 Article 2
requires states to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.”107 Article 33 requires parties to a dispute, “the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security,” to first seek a solution by peaceful means.108
Furthermore, in addition to violating Articles 2(3) and 33 of the UN
Charter, the United States’ retaliatory attack on Afghanistan should not be
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regarded as an act of self-defense even though the Security Council held
that the U.S attacks on Afghanistan were justified under Article 51.109
Afghanistan’s involvement in the attacks on U.S. soil did not rise to the
degree of state sponsorship. The United States has a better argument that its
attacks were justified because state inaction was present under the Corfu
Channel rationale, though that rationale provides a fundamentally weak
justification.
The other U.S justification, not entirely based on self-defense, is that al
Qaeda and the Taliban had hijacked the state of Afghanistan and the United
States was not only protecting its interest but was also liberating
Afghanistan. The United States could also argue that it was not undertaking
self-defense measures, which are subject to some necessary preconditions,
but was after being directly attacked, taking “proportionate
countermeasures” (a phrase that is yet largely undefined, under the rationale
of the Nicaragua case) after being directly attacked.110

III. THE CONTINUED ATTACKS ON AFGHANISTAN AND SELFDEFENSE
Alternatively, assuming that the initial U.S. attack on Afghanistan
satisfied the requirements of Article 51, the question becomes whether the
United States’ continued bombing of Afghanistan would still qualify as
self-defense under Article 51. It should be noted that self-defense measures
under the Article can only be taken to the extent that the “armed attack” has
not ended.111 If the armed attack has ended, any retaliation would be
retributive or punitive in nature, and thus, the action would not conform
with Article 51.112
Determining whether the armed attack against the United States had
ended prior to its extensive bombing of Afghanistan requires defining when
the termination of an armed attack occurs. The international community
has restrictively defined the termination of an armed attack.113 For
example, the 1986 U.S. bombing raids on Libya were condemned, as Libya
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was not engaged in a current ongoing armed attack against the United
States.114 Likewise, Israeli military incursions across the UN armistice line
in 1956115 and the Israeli bombing of Hezbollah positions in Southern
Lebanon in 2006 were internationally condemned.116 Israel’s justification
for its actions, based on the accumulation of event theory, was rejected.117
The international community took the contrary view and held that sporadic
and isolated incidents by armed groups, even if with state support, did not
constitute an armed attack.118
Some critics forcefully argue that the UN has recently preferred an
expansive view relative to the notion of the duration of an armed attack.119
This was the case when the United States attacked Iraq in 1993 with cruise
missiles.120 The cruise attack was based on the rationale that an
assassination attempt against the former U.S. President George Bush when
visiting Kuwait was an armed attack in process against the United States.121
This was not an armed attack because the attempt was never carried to
fruition, and the threat of such an act had subsided before the United States
attacked Iraq because President Bush had safety returned to the United
States.122
Despite this questionable logic, criticism of the United States for its
attacks on Iraq during the 1990s by the UN was lacking.123 A superficial
analysis of such recent developments does seem to suggest that that the
expansive view of the duration of an armed attack has displaced the
restrictive view.124 However, that is not the case. The UN’s muted reaction
to American attacks on Iraq was not because the view of the international
community relative to the duration of armed attack had changed. The real
reason for the lack of criticism was because the United States had surfaced
as a hegemonic state in the 1990s, and individual states had strategically
decided not to be critical of the United States. States were concerned that
any criticism could make them vulnerable to the possibility of adverse
measures taken against them by the United States. These states rightly
feared that the serious unilateral U.S. punitive measures that might follow
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would have a crippling effect on their respective economies. It is
reasonable to suggest that if any other state besides the United States had
taken such retaliatory actions against Iraq, it would have indeed been
subject to immense condemnation by the world community. The restrictive
notion of armed attack therefore still exists.
The September 11 attacks ended after they were perpetrated. In addition,
the fact that no subsequent attacks have been witnessed against the United
States confirms this conclusion. Any future probability of an attack is a
mere threat. As mentioned earlier, any retaliation to threats is an act of
anticipatory self-defense and therefore cannot be justified under Article
51.125
A. Customary International Law and Self-Defense under Article 51
Even when self-defense is appropriate under Article 51, a state must
conform to the requirements of necessity, proportionality,126 and
immediacy.127 These three variables act as constraints on unqualified
retaliatory action and are essential elements of customary international
law.128 It is imperative that these three variables are analyzed against the
backdrop of Article 51’s enactment. Utilizing such an analysis will not only
provide a clearer comprehension of such elements, but will also clarify the
intent of the drafters of the Charters with regard to the scope of the use of
force to fall under Article 51.
During the era preceding the enactment of Article 51, certain acts of
anticipatory self-defense were held to conform to the necessity and
proportionality requirements of customary international law. For example,
the world community somewhat accepted British actions in 1940 as
reasonable and proportional in nature for the purposes of self-defense when
Britain destroyed the Oran fleet of the Vichy French government129 before it
fell in the hands of the Germans and could have been used against Britain.
After witnessing the ruins of World War II, the world community drafted
the Charter with the precise goal of preventing future war at all costs.130
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The drafters no longer considered anticipatory forms of self-defense as a
viable option of self-defense, as it was precisely the kind of act that
fomented an armed conflict. When the adequacies of the requirements of
necessity, proportionality, and immediacy are examined, it is essential that
an extremely restrictive approach be taken in order to realize the intent of
the framers of the UN Charter in proscribing anticipatory forms of selfdefense.
1. Immediacy Requirement
First, the immediacy requirement of self-defense is inextricably tied to
the necessity requirement131—if an action taken in self-defense does not
require immediacy, then it is de facto unnecessary. Waiting too long to
retaliate is also proof that the action eventually taken was not one of last
resort.132 The time limitation is also present to prevent innumerable state
reprisals to prior unlawful acts of force. The critical nature of a timely
response can best be illustrated by analyzing the Caroline dispute between
the United States and the United Kingdom, which related to the
unsuccessful 1837 rebellion in Upper Canada against British rule.133 Then
U.S. Secretary Daniel Webber, during the exchange of diplomatic notes
between the involved governments, presented the often-quoted framework
for self-defense relative to immediacy and necessity. Under the framework
for the Caroline paradigm, only when the danger posed to a state is “instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation”134 can a state respond.
The United States attacked Afghanistan a whole month after the
September 11 attacks. This was a calculated decision and was subject to
extensive deliberation. Such a decision suggests that the danger posed to
the United States was neither instant nor overwhelming. Thus, the
immediacy requirement was not met.135
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2. Necessity Requirement
Second, the necessity requirement can only be met when all other
alternative peaceful means of resolution of the dispute or issue are
exhausted, given the time constraints involved.136 The Caroline paradigm is
equally applicable to the necessity requirement137—there must be no other
choices nor moments of deliberation available before undertaking selfdefense.138
In recent decades, rapid technological advancements in the warfare
industry have rendered the necessity analysis extremely complex,139 as
hostile states possess nuclear-laced delivery systems capable of destroying
states within a span of minutes. Although these new technological
developments need to be factored into the necessity analysis, no form of
anticipatory defensive measures can be tolerated. This system might be far
from perfect, but adoption of alternative paradigms would invite disaster.
In today’s nuclear day and age, any form of anticipatory self-defense
justification can easily trigger a nuclear war.
It was unnecessary for the United States to attack Afghanistan for selfdefense purposes. Afghanistan, which is not a state sponsoring terrorism,
had made repeated requests to the United States for credible evidence of bin
Laden’s as well as al Qaeda’s involvement in the terrorist attacks. This was
a reasonable request, but the United States paid it no heed. Afghanistan had
also offered to hand over bin Laden to a neutral country such as Jordan,140
where he would have been tried for a determination of culpability under
Jordanian law. The United States again ignored Afghanistan’s proposal,
which was extremely unreasonable on its part, because of the United States’
ratification of the Montevideo Convention and because of the UN Charter’s
provision for sovereign equality of all states.
The United States has ratified the Montevideo Convention of 1933, under
which states are juridically equal.141 The UN Charter provides for the
sovereign equality of all states.142 An essential corollary of sovereign
equality is the principle that the courts of one state do not question the
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validity of acts carried out in another.143 Hence, the United States is under
an obligation to respect the credibility of the judicial systems of other
member states. In addition, the United States enjoys considerable political,
military, and economic prowess as compared to Jordan, a key U.S. ally.144
If bin Laden were handed over to Jordan,145 the United States would in fact
have had the power to influence bin Laden’s indictment, even if in reality
there was not enough proof to indict him under the Jordanian judicial
system. In fact, the United States even may have been able to extradite bin
Laden to the United States from Jordan.
This dilemma of choice of law is the result of U.S. foreign policy.
Specifically, the United States impeded the creation of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) because of fears that U.S. executives and Israeli
officials would become subject to the authority of the ICC and possibly be
indicted for war crimes as a result of military adventurism. Had the ICC
been in existence, bin Laden and other al Qaeda members would have been
charged with international crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC and
would then be adjudged within the auspices of this unbiased international
court.
The unreasonableness of the United States’ stance is further substantiated
by the fact that President Bush publicly stated on several occasions that no
bargaining was to take place with Afghanistan.146 The only way the Taliban
could avoid a U.S. armed attack was to hand over bin Laden immediately
and allow the United States to maintain a military presence in Afghanistan
for the purpose of hunting down supposed terrorists and ensuring the
closure of all training camps, “the Madrassahs,”147 which provided both
Islamic education and military training.148 In fact, President Bush had
further sent a message to the Taliban administration that it would “pay a
price”149 if it did not hand over bin Laden.150 This is surely not the proper
way to bargain, especially with a fundamentalist regime like the Taliban.
Afghanistan functions under a tribal code of conduct under which honor
is the most salient feature of the system. Any act challenging the honor of
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the Afghanis compels them to sacrifice their lives if the need is felt, no
matter the consequences.151 Rather than challenging the Afghani culture
and values, the United States should have been more tolerant and
understanding of the Afghani culture. Surely engaging the Afghanis in a
less hostile manner could have rendered productive results, even to the
extent that this whole dispute could have been solved through alternative,
peaceful means over time. All these various facts are sufficient proof that
the United States did not exhaust all alternative peaceful,152 diplomatic,
political, and bargaining means to deal with the issue at hand.153
The concept of necessity in self-defense also requires that the use of selfdefense bring an end to the dangers present. The U.S. bombing did not
accomplish this feat in any way. First, none of the terrorists involved in the
terrorist activities on September 11 were Afghans; they were all Arabs.154
This suggests that the root cause of such terrorism, as well as the major
operatives and finances of these outfits, are not present in Afghanistan but
in countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Thus, an attack by the United
States against Afghanistan cannot purport to address the initial threat of
terrorism emanating from the Middle East. However, the United States has
not penalized these other countries because that would jeopardize the U.S.
oil supply provided by these Arab states.
Second, the objectives of the bombing were vague, and no concrete goals
in this fight against terrorism had been clearly outlined. Other Muslim
states such as Iran have been vaguely indicated as likely future targets for
fomenting terrorism.155 Carpet and cluster bombing from miles in the sky
resulted in the deaths of thousands of Afghan civilians and children, and the
destruction of numerous mosques.156 These actions infuriated the Muslim
masses all around the world,157 and as a result, for every genuine terrorist
killed in such military encounters, hundreds are born daily in the Muslim
world. Even by crushing the Taliban, the U.S. bombing campaign in
Afghanistan did not alleviate, but rather increased, the danger of future
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attacks on the United States. Therefore, the U.S. actions did not end the
danger as required for self-defense.
The correct, advisable, and peaceful alternative solution to this terrorism
problem is for the United States to revise its foreign policy. By not taking
sides in the Palestine and Israel conflict and by not supporting and/or
providing military assistance to Israel, the United States would help
decrease the distrust, hatred, and anger it faces in the Muslim world. As a
result, such terrorist acts fueled by frustration would not be supported or
undertaken by most Muslims. Israel has used U.S. military equipment and
economic aid for all sorts of aggression against Palestine and other Arab
states and has, on numerous occasions, been condemned by the UN for such
aggression.158 However, with the UN General Assembly resolutions
ineffectual in the face of U.S. resistance,159 these Arab states view Israel
and the United States as the same entity—the aggressor.
3. Proportionality Requirement
The final requirement of self-defense, proportionality, is two-pronged.160
Under the first prong, the response must be proportional to the wrong
suffered.161 In other words, the adverse impact on the attacked party must
be proportionate to the damages suffered by the state acting in self-defense.
Therefore, a self-defense action in which large parts of enemy territory are
occupied on the basis of self-defense would not be proportional162 if the
action was taken in retaliation to minor border skirmishes.163
Some believe that proportionality should be measured not by the impact
and damage inflicted on the enemy state’s military and governmental
installations, but rather by the impact on innocent civilians. This is
unreasonable because damage to government infrastructure will indirectly
and invariably result in an adverse impact on civilians. The 1991 and 1993
Gulf Wars are prime examples of this phenonom, in which a
disproportionate number of civilians died as a result of American
destruction of Iraqi infrastructure and international sanctions.164
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The second prong of proportionality is that “the response must be
proportional in terms of the nature and the amount of force employed to
achieve the objective or goal”;165 therefore, the acting state’s actions must
be confined to the removal of the danger. Indiscriminate bombing of a state
charged with terrorism, rather than strategic precision-guided bombing of
only terrorist camps and related infrastructure, is not a proportionate
response.166
The U.S. attack on Afghanistan was far from proportionate under
customary international law.167 First, under the first prong of the
proportionality requirement, the culpability of the Afghani establishment
(state support) with regard to the terrorist attacks on September 11 was not
of such a level that it could be subjected to a full-fledged war. The damage
inflicted on Afghanistan was extremely disproportionate to the damage
inflicted on the United States on September 11.168
The United States destroyed an already moth-ridden government
infrastructure. It demolished what remained of airports, government
buildings, mosques, old homes, and hospitals which barely operated in this
poor state. In addition, on numerous occasions, international aid workers
were killed, and buildings belonging to international organizations such as
the International Red Cross were also destroyed.169 The United States also
continued pointless bombing of the cities of Kabul and Gardez even when
the Taliban had long retreated from these cities.
With regard to direct human lives lost, the response was grossly
disproportionate between the United States and Afghanistan. The loss of
life in the United States was estimated at 2,973 people.170 On the other
hand, not only did thousands of innocent Afghani civilians die directly as a
result of American bombs, but 900,000 people faced imminent starvation—
twenty percent of which were under the age of five.171 An additional 2.5
million people were displaced and attained refugee status.172 The U.S.
bombing has also created a political vacuum in the country, raising renewed
fears of a civil war and strife.
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Under the second prong of the proportionality requirement, the intensity
of the U.S. bombing was far from the lowest degree of force needed to
attain the stated objective. Rather than sending U.S. ground troops to
Afghanistan to battle with the Taliban and the al Qaeda network at the
outset, which would have ensured minimal Afghani civilian causalities and
other forms of related damages, the United States engaged in air bombing to
avoid suffering war casualties. Bombs and missiles cannot distinguish
between terrorists and civilians. In turn, these bombs did not specifically
target so-called terrorist camps, but rather were indiscriminately used.173
More civilians than Taliban fighters died in the attacks.174 The United
States’ use of carpet and cluster bombs was not precision guided. Exploded
cluster bombs killed hundreds of civilians, and unexploded bombs became
land mines causing casualties when mistaken for food drops.175 For all
these reasons, U.S. activities in Afghanistan did not meet the proportionality
requirement.
B. Self-Defense as an Interim Right
Self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter is an interim right—a
state must cease retaliatory operation when “the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”176 The
United States’ bombing of Afghanistan was more or less unilateral. One
has to reject as circular any argument on the part of the United States
justifying its continuing war against the Taliban and al Qaeda on the
grounds that the Security Council had not taken the appropriate measures
under Article 51. After all, it was the United States and NATO which
prevented the Security Council from taking the adequate measures.177
Notably, the General Assembly and the Security Council had passed
numerous resolutions on the War on Terror.178 The General Assembly
resolution passed on September 12, 2001, stressed that “those responsible
for aiding, supporting, or harboring the perpetrators, organizers, and
sponsors of such acts will be held accountable.”179 It further outlined the
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need for all actions taken in the future to be concerted and multilateral.180
The Security Council on September 28, 2001, again unanimously agreed
upon the need to tackle terrorism and undertake collective action.181
Building upon its previous resolution182 and overriding the conventional
regime concerning international terrorism, Resolution 1373 affirmed the
right to self-defense; however, it failed to lay down a definition of
international terrorism,183 thereby leaving the decision as to what counts as
international terrorism to individual states. Resolution 1373 provides states
with the discretion to take unilateral action in the name of countering
international terrorism.184
In the case of Afghanistan, the United States continued to act by itself,
with some assistance from its NATO ally, Britain.185 Similar unilateral
decision making on the part of the United States was witnessed in 2003 with
its operations in Iraq. One could argue that after escaping any liability in
Afghanistan, the United States used Iraq as a way to further gauge its
position vis-à-vis the Security Council. There is also debate over whether
Operation Iraqi Freedom was the United States’ way of testing ground for
Iran.186
Once the Security Council agreed that the United States was justified in
its initial attack against the Taliban187 and that a severe act of aggression
and breach of peace had taken place, it was relatively easy for the United
States to make the Security Council determine under Article 39188 that use
of force was required under Article 42189 of the Charter. This is because
Article 41190 measures had already been deemed ineffective against
Afghanistan. (Article 41 includes the use of economic, communication, and
diplomatic measures for the purpose of forcing a state to comply with the
mandates of the Security Council.191) In recent years, all but three states
had severed diplomatic relations with Afghanistan.192 Afghanistan was also
under severe economic sanctions, and all international flights to and from
Afghanistan, with the exception of a handful of humanitarian aid-related
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flights, were banned. However, as previously noted, such measures did not
affect the strength or the policies of the Taliban government.
Hence under Article 43,193 the United States and any other UN member
could have been directed to continue using force against the Taliban and al
Qaeda; such collective action and resources would have been more effective
in tackling the threat of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. In other
words, international peace and security could have been maintained. It
defeats the purpose of the Charter if a claim of inaction is made on behalf of
the UN when the United States itself is wholly responsible for such UN
inaction.
The environment that prevailed in the world arena at that time was also
very conducive to a concerted and multilateral force sanctioned by the
Security Council being deployed against Afghanistan. The nature of the
current terrorism problem is such that the vested interests of all the
permanent members of the Security Council are aligned.194 Russia and
China, who generally oppose U.S. international policy decisions, have
provided unstinted support to the United States.195 These states themselves
hold the Taliban and Osama bin Laden responsible for instigating Islamic
insurgent movements on their soil. Besides, by aligning with the United
States, Russia and China are aware that the United States would no longer
be as critical, in at least the interim, of human rights violations that they
have committed or will continue to commit generally or in the course of
crushing secessionist movements. These two nations have always viewed
their actions as internal matters.196 In fact, other large countries such as
India have aligned with the United States for precisely the same reasons.197
In addition, different and more efficient military tactics could have been
utilized by the aforementioned multilateral force with the objective of fully
accomplishing the goals that the United States is striving to achieve. Small,
specialized, and trained commando units, drawing recruits from a multitude
of nations, directly under the command and control of the UN,198 could have
targeted al Qaeda camps in a hit-and-run ground offensive with the aim of
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assassinating or capturing bin Laden, his operatives, and the top brass of the
Taliban government. This operation could have been undertaken by
utilizing the most sophisticated weaponry coupled with the assistance of the
Northern Alliance, which consists of the army of northern Afghans fighting
the Taliban.
Once individuals such as bin Laden and Mullah Omer, the supreme
commander of the Taliban, had been disposed of, the Taliban regime would
have automatically crumbled. Afghanistan is a fragmented country, torn by
civil war and ethnic strife for decades. Without a central Taliban command,
this militia would have been too weak and unable to stop the numerous
powerful local warlords from overrunning it. Therefore, under this
alternative military tactic, thousands of civilian lives, which were lost
through indiscriminate U.S. bombings, could have been saved.

IV. REMEDIAL MEASURES
Though seemingly appealing, revising Article 51 would have adverse
repercussions for international peace and security, especially if the balance
of powers shifted in the international arena. Unilateral action by states
would inevitably lead to attacks in anticipatory self-defense. The language
the framers of Article 51 utilized was very specific and was chosen after
extensive analysis and deliberations, with the objective of minimizing the
evil of war—the major variable that threatens international peace and
security. Article 51, from its inception, has been extremely effective in
achieving the objective of controlling and preventing wars. Any
modifications to Article 51 are, therefore, a recipe for disaster.
The solution to this problem is that states should not attack other states
without waiting for the results of a thorough international investigation of
factual disputes regarding state terrorism. In other words, states must not
retaliate against other states unless the threat of terrorist attacks, based on
publicly disclosed facts, is of utmost gravity, and no other options are
available for the retaliating state to prevent an imminent attack. In addition,
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the UN must undertake a two-step retroactive review of actions taken after
all the events have unfolded.199 The UN must undertake a retroactive
review of actions to determine: (1) the credibility of the threat faced by the
retaliating state, and (2) the appropriateness of the state’s use of force.200
The UN must not sanction unwarranted conduct.201
The UN must also determine what level of remedial action undertaken by
a state said to have indulged in terrorism alleviates the culpability of that
state, and to what extent. There is, however, some guidance on this issue.
In 1988, the International Court of Justice considered whether remedial
actions taken by Libya were sufficient to mitigate the terrorist conduct in
which it was accused of participating. The court rejected Libya’s claim that
Libya’s trial of its own nationals for terrorism against civil aviation was
sufficient under the Montreal Convention of September 23, 1971.202 The
court held that the supposed terrorists, who were thought to be Libyan
agents, had to be extradited. Therefore, it can reasonably be argued that
nothing short of handing over a state terrorist can even qualify as a remedial
measure.203

V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. attacks on Afghanistan cannot be justified on the basis of selfdefense. Although the United States was subjected to an armed attack,
Afghanistan cannot be seen to have undertaken the attack itself because the
nature of the relationship between Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban militia and
the terrorists who had undertaken the attack was not sufficient to establish
the existence of state sponsorship. However, even assuming the United
States had authority under Article 51 to attack initially, its ongoing bombing
of Afghanistan was not authorized because the action against the United
States stopped on September 11, 2001, and the United States failed to
consistently conform with norms of customary international law of
necessity, immediacy, and proportionality. The United States’ response and
similar actions undertaken by other states would only be in compliance with
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international law if the UN Charter itself is revised to explicitly broaden the
scope of Article 51 to accommodate and sanction such use of force.
However, because this approach is not advisable, the UN should play a
more proactive role, with a greater involvement of the General Assembly in
tandem with the Security Council, in establishing processes and
mechanisms to deter conflagration of conflicts.
Specialized and empowered UN monitoring bodies (i.e., the United
Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee)204 must make swift, transparent,
and comprehensive fact-finding determinations concerning any acts of
aggression that can potentially invite retaliatory responses from states.
Such UN bodies would themselves be directly answerable to both the UN
General Assembly and Security Council. All states contemplating
retaliation under Article 51 must engage with such bodies and give due
consideration to the determinations provided before taking any military
action. Unless no other options are available for the retaliating state to
prevent the imminent attack, the retaliating state should be subject to UN
sanctions. The mechanism should be such that all states, regardless of their
economic and military status, should feel confident in approaching the UN
and having their grievances resolved in an equitable and a diplomatic
manner.

1

Assistant Professor, Department of Law and Policy, Lahore University of
Management Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan. With thanks for research assistance to Angbeen
A. Mirza (LLB 2008).
2
NY Mayor Urges Anti-Terror Pact, BBC NEWS, Oct. 2, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
hi/english/world/americas/newsid_1573000/1573818.stm.
3
September 11: Chronology of Terror, CNN.COM, Sept. 12, 2001, http://edition.
cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/chronology.attack/.
4
Id.
5
U.S. Deaths in Iraq, War on Terror Surpass 9/11 Toll, CNN.COM, Sept. 3, 2006,
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/09/03/death.toll/.
6
Malcolm Shaw, War View: Keep the Response Legal, BBC NEWS, Oct. 9, 2001,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/uk/newsid_1587000/1587034.stm.

PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

The U.S. Attacks on Afghanistan 183

7
Letter from John D. Negroponte, Permanent Representative of the U.S. to the United
Nations, to President of the United Nations Sec. Council (Oct. 7, 2001), U.N. Doc.
S/2001/946 (2001).
8
Afghanistan’s Civilian Deaths Mount, BBC NEWS, Jan. 3, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/south_asia/1740538.stm.
9
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BACKGROUNDER, NO SAFE REFUGE: THE IMPACT OF THE
SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS ON REFUGEES, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND MIGRANTS IN THE
AFGHANISTAN REGION AND WORLDWIDE 3–4 (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/
backgrounder/refugees/refugee-bck1017.pdf.
10
See generally id. at 4.
11
U.N. Charter art. 51.
12
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
13
See U.N. Charter art. 39.
14
U.N. Charter art. 51.
15
RICHARD J. ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATESPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 25 (1989) (citing BRIAN JENKINS, THE STUDY
OF TERRORISM: DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS 1 (1981)).
16
See TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (Rosalyn Higgins & Maurice Flory
eds., 1997).
17
See id.
18
See id.
19
See id.
20
See id. at 15.
21
See id.
22
Jaume Saura, Some Remarks on the Use of Force Against Terrorism in Contemporary
International Law and the Role of the Security Council, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 7, 13 n.24 (2003). For example, under the realist definition for terrorism, during the
gulf war, Iraq could have convincingly argued that United States indulged in a terrorist
activity when it instilled fear in the Iraqi public as well as when it coerced the Iraqi
regime for the purpose of attaining Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
23
Id. at 13.
24
See TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16, at 16.
25
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Measures to Prevent
Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/44/456/Add. 1 (Oct. 10, 1989); Saura, supra note 22, at 13 n.24.
26
With the removal of the Soviet view to counter the realist perspective, whatever
definition of terrorism that suited developed western nations now prevailed.
27
G.A. Res. 44/22, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/29
(Nov. 16, 1989) (recognizing the territorial sovereignty and integrity of all parties, and
affirming the needs for both parties to adhere to international law, during the occupation
of Kampuchea) .
28
For example, when the United States bombed a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory on
August 20, 1998, the superpower claimed that its activities were not terrorism. See Jules
Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and
Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 537, 537 (1999). Although many innocent Sudanese
civilians were killed, the United States managed to appease the UN by arguing that,

VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 1 • 2007

184 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

keeping in view the present circumstances, such action was taken in self-defense. See id.
The United States provided similar answers to its critics, who argue that the killing of
innocent Afghani civilians and the threat of death to many more of their countrymen as a
result of extensive U.S. bombing raids were, in fact, instances of terrorism. It is
important to point out that the United States often bombed residential areas in
Afghanistan and caused massive civilian casualties, explaining the incidents as results of
technical mistakes and/or “collateral damage.”
29
See JOHN F. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 31–32
(1989).
30
ERICKSON, supra note 15, at 31.
31
See generally TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16, at 202.
32
ERICKSON, supra note 15, at 32.
33
See id. at 33.
34
Such was the case, for example, when the Somalian government requested help from
West Germany during an air hijacking in 1977. Id. at 33.
35
See id.
36
See generally TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16, at 207.
37
See id. at 207.
38
D.G. Stephens & M.D. Fitzpatrick, Legal Aspects of Naval Mine Warfare, 21 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 553, 572 (1999).
39
Later Israel, using the same principle as the United Kingdom, violated the territorial
integrity of Uganda. See TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16. The
Israelis argued that their intervention in Entebbe was justified because Uganda was not in
a position to handle the hijacking. They also argued that they were substituting for
Uganda, which was justified as some nationals on the Air France flight were Israelis.
40
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
41
See generally Erik Suy, Is the United Nations Security Council Still Relevant? And
Was it Ever?, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7 (2004).
42
In July 2006, for example, such a situation was encountered when Israel unilaterally
decided to attack and invade Lebanon without the advice, consent, or approval of either
the United Nations Security Council or the General Assembly. Israel’s sole justification
for the attack was that Hizbollah had captured Israeli soldiers in Israel, thereby
compelling Israel to retaliate in the interest of its national security. Joshua Frank,
Kidnapped in Israel or Captured in Lebanon?: Official Justification for Israel’s Invasion
on Thin Ice, Jul. 25, 2006, http://www.antiwar.com/frank/?articleid=9401. Additionally,
Israel leveled the allegation that Lebanon had shown inaction in controlling Hizbollah, a
“powerful political and military organisation of Shia Muslims in Lebanon.” Who Are
Hezbollah?, BBC NEWS, Jul. 13, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/
4314423.stm. Israel’s armed aggression against Lebanon resulted in extensive damage to
the Lebanese economy and infrastructure. Israel grossly violated the international laws
of war through its indiscriminate bombings. Hizbollah’s counter retaliation, shelling
Israel with cluster-bombs in contravention of international humanitarian law, threatened
international peace and security. Frank, supra; see also Who Are Hezbollah?, supra.
43
See ERICKSON, supra note 15, at 33.
44
See id. at 33.

PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

The U.S. Attacks on Afghanistan 185

45
Pakistan has often been accused of tolerating terrorist groups that operate from its
territory. These accusations are made especially by India, in the context of the
longstanding conflict between the two countries over the disputed territories of Kashmir.
Many in Pakistan support such activity on the basis of Islam, which they see as the cause.
Kashmir Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan’s Terrorism Dilemma, National Defense University,
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2003/haqqani.htm (last visited May 1, 2007).
46
Id.; MURPHY, supra note 29, at 33. However, transportation provided to hijackers by
Egypt as part of negotiations in the Achilles Lauro case was not seen as state support.
Customary international law does not oblige states to punish pirates. See TERRORISM
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16, at 208; MURPHY, supra note 29, at 99. Egypt
was to either try the offenders in its own jurisdiction or extradite them to a third state.
Gerald P. McGinley, The Achille Lauro Affair – Implications for International Law, 52
TENN. L. REV. 691, 717 (1985). Since Egypt had no extradition treaty with the United
States, it was under no obligation to extradite the offenders to the U.S. Id.
47
See ERICKSON, supra note 15, at 33.
48
See id. at 32.
49
See id.
50
See id.
51
See Sara N. Scheideman, Standards of Proof in Forcible Responses to Terrorism, 50
SYRACUSE L. REV. 249, 260 (2000).
52
See supra text accompanying note 28.
53
One way to address the dangers of unnecessary state retaliation is to disallow states
from attacking other states on the premise of state sponsorship, at least until the United
Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) determines that the level of proof it
possesses, after extensive inquiries gathered from all concerned parties, is sufficient to
warrant an armed intervention. See generally S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373
(Sept. 28, 2001).
54
For example, the U.S. attack on the El Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Sudan occurred
on August 20, 1998, shortly after the U.S embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya.
Lobel, supra note 28, at 537. The United States claimed that it had credible evidence that
the factory was producing, or was about to produce, chemical weapons for Osama bin
Laden’s al Qaeda organization and that the weapons were going to be used on various
U.S targets. Sandy Berger, Nat’l Sec. Advisor, White House Special Briefing: Continued
U.S. Efforts Against Terrorism (Aug. 21, 1998), in FED. NEWS SERVICE. Later,
investigations suggested that the El Shifa was in fact a pharmaceutical plant and a major
pharmaceutical producer in Sudan. Lobel, supra note 28, at 546. Soil samples from the
site revealed no proof of chemical weapons production. See James Risen & David
Johnston, Experts Find No Arms Chemicals at Bombed Sudan Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
1999, at A3. But see Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., The Use of Armed Force Against
Terrorism: American Hegemony or Impotence?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 37, 45 (2000). In
addition, the American engineer who designed the plant claimed that the plant had no
capability to produce nerve gas. Hassan Ibrahim et al., The Missiles, the Bungling
Pentagon and the Nerve Gas Factory that Never Was: The U.S. Engineer Who Drew up
the Plans for the Al-Shifa Plant Has Shaken American Claims that it Was Producing
Chemical Weapons, THE OBSERVER (London), Aug. 30, 1998, at 4. The owner of the

VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 1 • 2007

186 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

plant was later cleared of any links to the al Qaeda network. The end result was that a
major pharmaceutical plant routinely visited by World Health Organization
representatives and foreign dignitaries, which was also a major source of essential
medicines for a poor country, was destroyed. See Lobel, supra note 28, at 546; Risen &
Johnston, supra; Ibrahim et al., supra. But see Sharp, supra.
55
See South Asia’s Nuclear Shadow, BBC NEWS, May 27, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2010622.stm; Time “Running out” over Kashmir,
BBC NEWS, June 5, 2002, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/
2026573.stm; Analysis: South Asia’s Nuclear Brinksmanship, BBC NEWS, May 29, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2013471.stm.
56
Time “Running out” over Kashmir, supra note 55; Analysis, supra note 55; Impact of
a Nuclear Strike, BBC NEWS, May 29, 2002, htpp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/
2012543.stm.
57
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 166 (3d ed. 2001).
58
Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L.
227, 229 (2003).
59
See Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Acts as “Armed Attack”: The Right to Self-Defense,
Article 51 (1/2) of the UN Charter, and International Terrorism, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 35, Fall–Spring 2003, at 37.
60
G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); see
Bothe, supra note 58, at 230.
61
See Scheideman, supra note 51, at 268 n.129.
62
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
63
See Amy E. Eckert & Manooher Mofidi, Doctrine or Doctrinaire—The First Strike
Doctrine and Preemptive Self-Defense Under International Law, 12 TUL. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 117, 135 (2004).
64
See DINSTEIN, supra note 57; Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 63, at 133–34.
65
Bothe, supra note 58, at 229.
66
See DINSTEIN, supra note 57; Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 63, at 133–34.
67
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed.
2002); DINSTEIN, supra note 57, at 167; see Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Myth of
Preemptive Self-Defense, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM, Aug.
2002, available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf.
68
DINSTEIN, supra note 57, at 176.
69
For example, the world community largely accepted the United States’ argument that
the Soviet Union’s installation of missiles in Cuba near the American shores was an
armed attack on the United States, which justified the U.S quarantine of Cuba in 1962.
See John R. Henriksen, International Claims to Anticipatory Self-Defense: A Juridical
Analysis 20, 30 (Sept. 30, 1981) (unpublished LLM thesis, The George Washington
University) (on file with The George Washington University). In contrast, the Israeli air
raids on an Iraqi nuclear reactor that was under construction in 1981 were condemned
and held to be in violation of international law. See id. at 96. Israel’s justification that an
armed attack had occurred against it because nuclear devices once produced by Iraq
would eventually be delivered against Israel was comprehensively rejected. See id. at
96–97. These examples illustrate that armed attacks against retaliating states are not truly

PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

The U.S. Attacks on Afghanistan 187

“armed attacks” where those states take anticipatory self-defensive measures. This is
because anticipatory self-defense allows the retaliating state to take defensive measures
before the imminence of the armed attack has actually been established. See id. at 15.
But see Thomas M. Franck, When, if Ever, May States Deploy Military Force without
Prior Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U. J.L & POL’Y 51, 59 (2001). In other
words, an armed attack is only imminent when it is underway. See generally DINSTEIN,
supra note 57.
70
See DINSTEIN, supra note 57, at 172.
71
Id.
72
See O’Connell, supra note 67, at 13.
73
DINSTEIN, supra note 57, at 172.
74
See id.
75
Ivo Daalder, policy brief, Pre-emptive Attack – Old Constraints, New Challenges,
United
Nations
&
Global
Security,
http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/
daalder_paper_preemption.pdf, (last visited Dec. 4, 2007).
76
See generally Stuart G. Baker, Comparing the 1993 U.S. Airstrike on Iraq to the 1986
Bombing of Libya: The New Interpretation of Article 51, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99,
100 (1994).
77
Derek Jinks, State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed Groups, 4 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 83, 88 (2003).
78
Cf. Saura, supra note 22, at 23 n.86 (attributing unlawful use of force to the former
Afghan government based on its aquiescence with perpetrators of crimes).
79
Jinks, supra note 77.
80
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
81
Id. at 104.
82
See DINSTEIN, supra note 57, at 182.
83
Nicar, 1986 I.C.J. at 119.
84
Id. at 120.
85
S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1368; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 53, ¶ 3–4; G.A.
Res. 56/1, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/1 (Sept. 12,
2001).
86
See Charles F. Parker & Eric K. Stern, Blindsided?: September 11 and the Origins of
Strategic Surprise, 23 POL. PSYCHOL.601, 604 (2002).
87
See TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16, at 18.
88
See id. at 20 (discussing the Lockerbie incident).
89
See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES, THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM, http://www.9-11commission.gov/
report/911Report_Ch2.htm.
90
See generally G.A. Res. 34/37, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 37, U.N. Doc.
A/34/37 (1979).
91
See IMPACT: Holy Terror (CNN television broadcast Aug. 10, 1997) (transcript
available at http://cnn.com/CNN/Programs?impact/9705/09/feature/transcript.ladin.html)
(interviewing Osama bin Laden).

VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 1 • 2007

188 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

92
Panorama: Ask Dr. Naseem (BBC television broadcast Oct. 16, 2001) (interviewing
the lay Chairman of Birmingham Central Mosque).
93
See DINSTEIN, supra note 57, at 182–83.
94
Country Profile: Afghanistan, BBC NEWS, Aug. 3, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
south_asia/country_profiles/1162668.stm.
95
The International Court of Justice had laid “effective control” (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27) as the minimum requirement level of involvement required on the part
of a state for it to be held liable for activity being undertaken in another state. Nicar.
1986 I.C.J. at 65. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia lowered that
requirement to “overall control.” (Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, T.Ch. II,
(Aug. 10, 1995)).
96
See Jinks, supra note 77, at 90; see Stahn, supra note 59, at 47.
97
Jinks, supra note 77, at 86.
98
See O’Connell, supra note 67, at 17. See generally Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 63.
99
O’Connell, supra note 67, at 3.
100
Id.
101
See Daalder, supra note 75.
102
David Sullivan, The Bombing of Afghanistan, 151 NEW L.J. 1778 (2001).
103
TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16, at 21.
104
Special Report: America Strikes Back (CNN television broadcast Oct. 14, 2001)
(transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0110/14/se.03.html).
105
Special Report: Attack on Afghanistan, Bush Rejects Taliban Offer to Hand bin Laden
Over, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Oct. 14, 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/
story/0,136,573975,00.html.
106
See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3; U.N. Charter art. 33.
107
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.
108
U.N. Charter, art. 33.
109
See Shaw, supra note 6.
110
See Lobel, supra note 28, at 556.
111
See Saura, supra note 22, at 23.
112
DINSTEIN, supra note 57, at 183–84; see CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE 121 (2d ed. 2004); Saura, supra note 22, at 25; see also Baker,
supra note 76, at 111–12. See generally Dino Kritsiotis, The Legality of the 1993 US
Missile Strike on Iraq and the Right of Self-Defence in International Law, 45 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 162 (1996).
113
See Baker, supra note 76, at 111–12.
114
Id.
115
See ERICKSON, supra note 15, at 143.
116
See generally The Secretary-General, Remarks to the Security Council on the Situation
in Lebanon, available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2152 (July 30,
2006).
117
See id.
118
See Stahn, supra note 59, at 46.
119
See Baker, supra note 76, at 109–10.
120
See id. at 112.

PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

The U.S. Attacks on Afghanistan 189

121

Kritsiotis, supra note 112, at 163.
See LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES, 126 (1995).
123
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 76, at 99.
124
See id. at 115–16.
125
See generally Lobel, supra note 28, at 544.
126
HENKIN, supra note 122, at 121.
127
See ERICKSON, supra note 15, at 144–46.
128
See generally Kritsiotis, supra note 112.
129
See Henriksen, supra note 69, at 8–9.
130
See U.N. Charter, preamble.
131
See Scheideman, supra note 51, at 272.
132
See ERICKSON, supra note 15, at 144.
133
See generally Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Lebanon, and Hizbullah: A Jurisprudential
Assessment, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 141, 150 (1997).
134
See Henriksen, supra note 69, at 5 (quoting Letter from Daniel Webster to Mr. Fox,
Apr. 24, 1841, 29 B.S.P. 1129 (1843)); HENKIN, supra note 122, at 121.
135
See Saura, supra note 22, at 25.
136
Sullivan, supra note 102.
137
See ERICKSON, supra note 15, at 145.
138
See Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 63, at 136 (“necessity in self-defense means that the
use of force must be absolutely necessary to repel the threat and that ‘peaceful measures
have been found wanting or . . . clearly would be futile.’” (quoting Oscar Schachter,
International Law in Theory and Practice, in DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
152 (1991))). Similarly, in the Nicaragua case, the I.C.J. held that actions taken in selfdefense were unnecessary when related dangers of action intended to be countered had
subsided. Scheideman, supra note 51, at 272. This holding was partly the result of the
observation that American actions had been taken, “several months after the major
offensive of the armed opposition against the government of El Salvador had been
completely repulsed.” Nicar., 1986 I.C.J. at 122. That “it was possible to eliminate the
main danger to the Salvadoran Government without the United States embarking on
activities in and against Nicaragua” was also essential to the I.C.J.’s findings. Id.
139
In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons in
Armed Conflict, the I.C.J. was itself unable to decide whether use of nuclear weapons in
anticipatory self-defense would be lawful if the very existence of the state was
threatened.
140
The Military Campaign, BBC NEWS, Oct. 23, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
world/newsid_1597000/1597509.stm.
141
Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 4, 49 Stat. 3097.
142
U.N. Charter, art 2, para. 1.
143
Faisal O. Al-Rfouh, Protection of National Sovereign Rights Under International
Law, Brigham Young University, http://kennedy.byu.edu/partners/WFPC/alrfouh.html
(last visited Dec. 4, 2007).
144
See ALFRED B. PRADOS, JORDAN: U.S. RELATIONS AND BILATERAL ISSUES 2–3
(Cong. Research Serv. 2006), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/
ib93085.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2007).
122

VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 1 • 2007

190 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

145

Rory McCarthy, Special Report: Attack on Afghanistan, New Offer on bin Laden:
Minister Makes Secret Trip to Offer Trial in Third Country, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Oct.
17, 2001, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,,575593,00.html.
146
Daniel Lak, Analysis: Decoding Taleban’s Message, BBC NEWS, Sept. 30, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_1571000/1571891.stm.
147
GRAY, supra note 112, at 159.
148
See generally Christine Fair, South Asia Expert, Research & Studies Program, The
United States and Pakistan: Navigating a Complex Relationship, Address Before the U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom (June 30, 2005) (summary available at
http://www.usip.org/congress/testimony/2005/0630_fair.html).
149
George W. Bush, President of the United States, Address to the Nation (Oct. 7, 2001)
(transcript available at http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/481921texts.html).
150
Id.
151
Jere Van Dyck, The Afghan Rulers: Fiercely Traditional Tribes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,
1981, at A2.
152
Cf. ERICKSON, supra note 15, at 145 (“[T]here must be . . . no other available peaceful
solution.”).
153
There were numerous diplomatic and political avenues open to the United States; it
could have worked through Pakistan, which exercised immense influence over the
Taliban. The Taliban also maintained relations with other influential governments,
including Saudi Arabia. In the past, the United States has also successfully engaged
countries that have limited relations with the outside world, such as North Korea and
Iran.
154
Official: 15 of 19 Sept. 11 Hijackers Were Saudi, USA TODAY, Feb. 6, 2002, available
at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002/02/06/saudi.htm.
155
David Shukman, Analysis: US Walks a Tightrope, BBC NEWS, Oct. 9, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle_east/newsid_1590000/1590118.stm.
156
Campaign Targets Lethal Cluster Bombs, BBC NEWS, Dec. 2, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newsid_1688000/1688556.stm.
157
Kathy Marks, Islamic Militants Threaten to Hunt Down Foreigners, THE
INDEPENDENT, Oct. 9, 2001, available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/
americas/article161006.ece.
158
TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16, at 204 (describing an Israeli
raid of Palestinian camps in Lebanon in 1975).
159
Mark Devenport, UN Holds Emergency Mid-East Debate, BBC NEWS, Oct. 17, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle_east/newsid_977000/977587.stm.
160
See generally Sullivan, supra note 102.
161
ERICKSON, supra note 15, at 146.
162
Id.
163
Germany had indulged in such an undertaking when it occupied Poland during World
War II.
164
See generally The Unfinished War: A Decade since Desert Storm Intent v. Effect:
Bombings and Sanctions Create Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq, CNN.COM (2001),
http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/unfinished/war/index1.html

PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

The U.S. Attacks on Afghanistan 191

(summarizing CNN’s Special Report, The Unfinished War: A Decade Since Desert
Storm).
165
ERICKSON, supra note 15, at 146.
166
See id. at 146–47; Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 63, at 137.
167
Saura, supra note 22, at 25; see also Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 63, at 144–45.
168
See GRAY, supra note 112, at 168.
169
The Military Campaign, supra note 140.
170
The Bitter Legacy of 9/11, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 11, 2006,
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politics/article1466758.ece.
171
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FATALLY FLAWED: CLUSTER BOMBS AND
THEIR USE BY THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN (2002).
172
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, 2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook: Afghanistan,
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/464183592.pdf.
173
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “ENDURING FREEDOM”: ABUSES BY U.S.
FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN, at 9 (March 2004).
174
Correspondent: The Dispossessed (BBC television broadcast Jan. 18, 2002), available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ programmes/correspondent/1764418.stm.
175
The Cluster Bomb Controversy, BBC NEWS, Apr. 3, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/uk_news/2912617.stm.
176
U.N. Charter art. 51.
177
Posting of Rashi Khanderia to http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/messages/42.html
(Feb. 27, 2002, 10:30:38).
178
Security Council Resolutions include S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec.
20, 2001); S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 (Dec. 6, 2001); U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378
(Nov. 14, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 53.
179
G.A. Res. 56/1, supra note 85.
180
Id.
181
S.C. Res 1373, supra note 53.
182
S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. Doc. S/ RES/1269 (Oct. 19, 1999).
183
Saura, supra note 22, at 21.
184
See S.C. Res 1373, supra note 53.
185
See Saura, supra note 22, at 22.
186
See Journalist: U.S. Planning for Possible Attack on Iran, CNN.COM, Jan. 17, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/01/16/hersh.iran/.
187
See S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 178, ¶ 3; S.C. Res. 1378, supra note 178, ¶ 3–5; Jinks,
supra note 77, at 86.
188
U.N. Charter art. 39.
189
U.N. Charter art. 42.
190
U.N. Charter art. 41.
191
Id.
192
Who Are the Taleban, BBC NEWS, Sept. 2, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/south_asia/ 1549285.stm.
193
U.N. Charter art. 43.
194
Saura, supra note 22, at 28.

VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 1 • 2007

192 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

195

SHIRLEY KAN, SPECIALIST IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
DEFENSE, AND TRADE DIVISION, U.S.–CHINA COUNTER TERRORISM COOPERATION:
ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21995.pdf;
Pavel Felgenhauer, A Vicious Circle of Terror, MOSCOW TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001,
available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/173.html.
196
See generally China Asks US to Look Beyond NATO, BBC NEWS, Sept. 13, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1541656.stm.
197
But see Sullivan, supra note 102 (“[T]o establish opinion juris it would be necessary
to show that the motive for this assistance is the belief that the U.S. has a legal right to
use force by way of self-defence because of Afghanistan’s harbouring of al Qaeda, rather
than political or economic motives.”).
198
It is not a desirable option in the present context, and it is unrealistic to assume that the
UN can command and sustain a complete functional army in today’s day and age.
199
See generally Lobel, supra note 28, at 553.
200
See generally id.
201
See generally supra text accompanying note 54.
202
See generally TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16, at 23.
203
See Michael Plachta, The Lockerbie Case: The Role of the Security Council in
Enforcing the Principle Aut Dedere Aut Judicare, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 125, 139–40
(2001).
204
See supra note 54.

PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

